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This paper examines the link between inequality and individual well-being using household 
survey data from 27 Transition Economies, where income inequality increased 
considerably since 1989. A test of inequality aversion in individual preferences that draws 
on the Fehr and Schmidt (QJE, 1999) specification of inequality aversion is proposed, and 
the difficulties of implementing it in a non-experimental setting are discussed. Estimates 
based on this model confirm aversion to inequality both in the overall sample and in the 
regional sub-samples. The Gini index, on the other hand, is unable to capture this negative 
effect of inequality on well-being. Notably, inequality aversion is not intrinsic. Rather, it 
appears to be tied to a concern with the fairness  of the institutions underlying the 
distribution of fortunes in society. The evidence is suggestive of inequality of opportunity 
driving attitudes toward overall inequality. Perceiving inequality  to be unfair is also 
associated with calls for strong government involvement in redistributive policies. 
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1 Introduction
On October 15, 2011 Occupy protests that originated with the Occupy Wall Street movement in New
York were planned in over 80 countries and 950 cities worldwide. These protests are perhaps the
most vivid manifestation of the growing global concern with equity and inequality, also reected in
China's pledge to create a\harmonious society", or in the indicators underpinning European Union's
\social inclusion agenda", or in the recommendation of the Sarkozy Commission (on the Measurement
of Economic Performance and Social Progress) that\[q]uality-of-life indicators in all the dimensions
covered should assess inequalities in a comprehensive way." (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009). This
concern is driven in part by the oftentimes sharp increase in the gap between the rich and the
poor over the past two decades in many OECD countries, in China, and in Eastern Europe. Yet,
the mapping from a given statistical measure of inequality to preferences for redistribution, or to
individual (social) welfare, and the importance of tradeos between the size of the pie and the
inequality in its distribution will be inuenced by the prevailing degree of inequality aversion in
society.1 The latter is the subject of this paper.
Some evidence of aversion to inequality can be inferred from the preferences for equity that
have been observed in tightly controlled lab experiments, where individuals have been observed to
have strong other-regarding preferences, to prefer equitable outcomes, and to engage in cooperation
(see Fehr and Schmidt 2006 for a comprehensive review of the literature). These other-regarding
preferences have been observed in a number of dierent games, such as ultimatum games (Thaler,
1988; Camerer and Thaler, 1995), public goods games with punishments (Fehr and Gachter, 1996),
or gift exchange games (Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997), as well as in other contexts.
This paper investigates, rather, the degree of inequality aversion based on nationally represen-
tative household survey data. Evidence on this is more scarce and generally looks at associations
between inequality, usually measured in terms of some statistical index like the Gini index, and
subjective well-being using household survey data (Tomes 1986; Clark 2003; Alesina et al. 2004;
Senik 2004; Graham and Felton 2006; Grosfeld and Senik 2010). A negative association between
inequality and well-being is viewed as indicative of inequality being a welfare-relevant consideration
1In the case of social welfare, the normative degree of inequality aversion in the social welfare function will also
play a crucial role (Sen 1997 provides a detailed discussion).
2in the population. The motivation behind this line of research stems from the argument that aversion
to inequality, by its nature, oers only a limited scope for revealed choice analysis, but more progress
could be made by analysing expressed preferences. These studies reach mixed conclusions, inequality
having either a positive, a negative, or no statistically discernible eect on individual well-being.
This paper suggests that if aversion to inequality is driven by social mobility considerations or by
dierences in status between self and relevant others, then aggregate statistical indices of inequality
will be unable to capture in a meaningful way changes in status implicit in inequality dynamics. An
alternative test of inequality aversion is adopted, that is better able to capture, I believe, status-
driven aversion to inequality. The test builds on the model of inequality aversion proposed in the
experimental literature by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which is closely related to earlier work on
relative deprivation by Yitzhaki (1979). The proposed specication, while intimately related to the
Gini index, allows us to make progress in settings where aggregate measures of inequality are less
appealing.
Several ndings emerge from this study. First, individuals are found to exhibit aversion to
inequality (in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and this result holds across a number of speci-
cations, and also across regional subsets of countries. The Gini index, on the other hand, is unable
to capture this negative eect of inequality on well-being. Second, inequality aversion does not ap-
pear to be intrinsic, but rather stems from a sense of fairness, as captured by opinions vis-a-vis the
main determinants of success and economic need in society. As such, the ndings are suggestive of
inequality of opportunity being the factor that is driving the individuals' responses to economic in-
equality. Finally, perceiving inequality to be unfair is also associated with calls for strong government
involvement in redistributive policies.
Section 2 reviews existing ndings on inequality and subjective well-being, discusses the proposed
methodology and addresses some of the diculties of testing for inequality aversion with large
household survey data. Section 3 describes the survey data employed in the empirical analysis.
Section 4 presents the main ndings, discusses the driving forces behind inequality aversion, and
considers implications for social welfare and support of redistributive policies. Section 5 concludes.
32 Social evaluation, inequality aversion, and reference groups
2.1 Existing literature
The primary aim of this paper is to test for inequality aversion using nationally-representative
survey data. In the existing literature there are two types of studies that share this goal, at least
to some degree. First, there are several recent studies that run experiments on populations that
go beyond the usual student setting. Guth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007) implement a three-person
ultimatum game experiment through the German weekly Die Zeit. A total of 5,132 readers took
part in the experiment, thus oering a much greater variation in socio-economic and demographic
characteristics in the participant group. Their ndings suggest considerable parallelism between
student and non-student behaviour, and thus help address the common objection that university
students who typically take part in laboratory experiments are not representative of the general
population. Bellemare et al. (2008) implement an ultimatum game relying on a representative
sample of the Dutch population drawn from the participants of the CentERpanel (2,000 households)
and nd that young and highly educated subjects have lower aversion to inequality than other groups.
Pirttila and Uusitalo (2010), using a representative survey of Finnish people, present survey
respondents with a 'leaky bucket' experiment in which they probe the respondent's willingness to have
the tax schedule adjusted to eect a transfer from the top income decile to the bottom income decile.
In addition, the authors also ask respondents to compare the Finnish wage distribution to alternative
distributions with a higher mean and dispersion of income. While they nd evidence in support of
inequality averse preferences, the results also suggest dierences between the two approaches - a large
group of respondents who supported more narrow wage dierences do not support costly progressive
transfers. The authors also nd inequality aversion to be strongly associated with attitudes to
increased tax progression, with increased unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance
benets, and with increased income support.
A somewhat larger, albeit still limited, literature looks at the association between individual
well-being and statistical measures of income inequality. This question is apart from the larger
literature that examines whether relative status concerns, such as those embodied in the relation of
someone's income to mean (or median) reference group income, or in someone's rank in the income
distribution, are relevant for individual well-being (Clark and Oswald 1996; McBride 2001; Ravallion
and Lokshin 2002; Blanchower and Oswald 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Graham
and Felton 2006; see also Clark et al. 2008 for a recent review of the literature). The relevant
question here is whether conditional on own income, and conditional on relative income, the degree
4of inequality in the distribution of incomes in a given group has an eect on individual well-being.
Existing studies that explore the relationship between inequality and welfare based on household
survey data generally model individual well-being { proxied by a measure of self-reported happiness
or life satisfaction { as a function of the Gini index or some other composite inequality measure. As
already noted, they arrive at mixed results.
Tomes (1986), using survey data from Canada, nds higher levels of inequality (as measured by
the income share of the poorest 40 percent of the population) to be positively associated with life
satisfaction among men, controlling for own income and average income in the district of residence.
Clark (2003) similarly nds, using data from the British Household Panel Survey, that well-being is
positively correlated with reference group income inequality measured by either the Gini coecient
or the 90th / 10th percentile ratio.
On the other hand, Alesina et al. (2004), relying on US GSS survey data from 1972-1997,
and Eurobarometer data for 1975-1992, nd that inequality (measured by the Gini coecient) has
a negative eect on happiness, controlling for own income and a number of socio-demographic
characteristics, albeit the relationship is less precisely estimated in the US sample. They also nd
a strong negative eect of inequality on happiness among the poor and the political left in Europe,
but not in the United States. A negative association between inequality and subjective evaluations
of the economic situation is found in the Grosfeld and Senik (2010) study on Poland, but only for
the second half of the transition period (1997-2005), whereas a positive association is found in the
early years (1992-1996).
Graham and Felton (2006), relying on Latinobarometro data from 18 countries in Latin America
nd country-level inequality measured by the Gini index to not have a statistically signicant eect
on happiness. Senik (2004), relying on panel data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey,
nds that neither national level inequality (measured by either Gini or Stark indices), nor the regional
or Primary Sampling Unit inequality, have a signicant eect on reported life satisfaction in Russia.
2.2 Proposed methodology
Imagine an increase in the Gini index of income inequality for a given group from, say, G1 = 0:22 to
G2 = 0:29. Assume further that the group in question is the relevant reference group (more on this
below) and that the inequality in the income space is the relevant dimension for well-being evaluation.
Should we expect this sizable increase in the Gini index to have an eect on individual well-being?
The answer to this question depends in part on whether individuals are averse to inequality, and
5if so, on the nature of this aversion. If aversion to inequality is based on its perception as a social
evil (Alesina et al. 2004), then higher inequality should reduce the (individual) well-being of all
irrespective of the underlying changes in the income distribution that precipitated the increase in
inequality, or of the individuals' position in this income distribution. If, on the other hand, aversion
to inequality is driven by perceptions of social mobility, aggregate national measures of inequality
may be limited in their ability to capture the subtle eects of inequality on prospects of social
mobility (Graham and Felton, 2006).
Similarly, if inequality aversion is driven by status considerations that are sensitive to the dis-
tribution of incomes in the group and not just the individual's position in the income distribution,
then aggregate measures of income distribution will provide little useful information on implicit
changes in status. Returning to the above increase in the Gini index, consider instead the income
distribution A1 = f100;200;300g that corresponds to G1and A2 = f100;200;400g that corresponds
to G2. For someone with the income equal to 100, for instance, the change in relative standing
embodied in the income gaps between her and others in A2 relative to the initial distribution A1
is much more explicit. The relative standing of the person whose income increases from 300 to 400
actually improves as inequality increases. It seems plausible for these bilateral dierences between
group members to be important factors determining well-being (if status considerations matter),
even if composite inequality indices generated by these are not, in themselves, meaningful indicators
of inequality of status.
These bilateral gaps form the basis of the relative deprivation measure proposed by Yitzhaki
(1979). Given a range of incomes (0;y), Yitzhaki denes the total deprivation of someone with













0 f(z)dz is the cumulative income distribution. This denition is a formalisation of
the concept of relative deprivation proposed by Runciman (1972). Yitzhaki further shows that the
degree of relative deprivation within a given group is the product of the group's mean income and








6A number of studies establish a negative relationship between Yitzhaki's measure of relative
deprivation D(yi) and individual well-being (D'Ambrosio and Frick, 2007) or health outcomes within
groups (Deaton, 2001; Eibner and Evans, 2005). On the other hand, if one were to model individual
well-being as a function of the Gini index of inequality, this implicitly assumes that an individual's
utility (proxied by the self-reported well-being score) depends not only on the relative deprivation
of that individual, which may be a reasonable assumption, but also - and with equal weights - on
the relative deprivation of all other individuals in a given reference group. The latter assumption is
much more stringent.
In light of the above considerations, this paper adopts an empirical test of inequality aversion
in individual preferences that is able to pick up inequality aversion driven by status considerations
such as those consistent with Yitzhaki's relative deprivation measure. The analytical set-up follows
the specication proposed in the experimental literature by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, hereafter FS),
who introduce inequality aversion into individual preferences as follows (using Yitzhaki's notation):








where y = y1;:::;ynis the vector of monetary payos, n is the number of players, and it is further
assumed that  1 <   0 and    (i.e.  is more negative than ).2 Thus, the individual's welfare
depends on income comparisons with the incomes of all other individuals in the reference group. The
second term on the right measures the utility loss associated with disadvantageous inequality, and
the third term measures the utility loss from advantageous inequality. The assumption     0
implies that utility loss is greater from disadvantage (i.e. there is loss aversion), which is also in
line with the ndings of prospect theory that individuals oftentimes evaluate outcomes as deviations
(losses or gains) from a certain reference point, and prefer avoiding losses more than acquiring
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).3 In the context of this paper  < 0 can indicate aversion
to inequality due to the uncertainty of social mobility prospects (especially worries about possible
downward mobility), and is also consistent with a preference for fairness with respect to the fortunes
of the poor.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that many of the manifestations of fair and cooperative behaviour
2Note a small change of notation from the FS formulation in order to make it easier to relate the structural
parameters of the model to the estimates in Section 4. In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the second and third terms are
subtracted from yi, and, respectively, 0   < 1, and   .
3Technically, loss aversion implies that that the disutility in the domain of losses is greater than the utility gain
in the domain of gains, whereas Fehr and Schmidt assume disutility from both disadvantageous and advantageous
inequality. They note that allowing for  < 0 (equivalent to  > 0 in our notation) does not alter equilibrium
behaviour in games they consider, albeit in principle, there is no reason why individuals cannot receive satisfaction
over the domain of incomes lower than their own.
7in experimental studies, such as those observed in ultimatum games (Thaler, 1988; Camerer and
Thaler, 1995), public goods games with punishments (Fehr and Gachter, 1996), or gift exchange
games (Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997) can be explained if a fraction of subjects are inequality
averse in the above sense. In particular, they note that\[t]his utility function can rationalize positive
and negative actions towards other players. It is consistent with generosity in dictator games and
kind behavior of responders in trust games and gift exchange games, and at the same time with the
rejection of low oers in ultimatum games. It can explain voluntary contributions in public good
games and at the same time costly punishments of free-riders." (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006:640)
The advantage of using the FS specication is that the test for inequality aversion is based on a
self-regarding utility function that only considers the relative deprivation of self, and not of all others
in the reference group. It is also easily observed that the FS specication is intimately related to
Yitzhaki's concept of relative deprivation - the second term in the FS utility function is Yitzhaki's
measure of relative deprivation D(yi), and the last term is a similar measure of normalised aggregate
income gap, but dened over incomes that are lower than the income of the individual i. If we take
Yitzhaki's measure of relative satisfaction S(yi), dened as: S(yi) =
 yi
0 [1 F(z)]dz, then the third
term in the FS utility function is
 yi
0 (yi   z)f(z)dz = yi   S(yi). Thus, the FS utility function can
be written as:
U(yi) = yi + D(yi) + (yi   S(yi))
As Yitzhaki's notes further, D(yi) =    S(yi); and substituting into the above equation, we can
rewrite U(yi) equivalently as a function own income, relative income, and Yitzhaki's relative depri-
vation, which is the specication used in section 4 of this paper:
U(yi) = yi + (yi   ) + ( + )D(yi)
A further advantage of using the FS specication in a cross-sectional setting stems from the fact
that it allows us to investigate the relationship between inequality and well-being at the level of the
individual. A regression of individual well-being on a group inequality measure (e.g. Gini or Theil
index) in a cross-section essentially looks at the relationship between the mean well-being level in a
group and the group's level of inequality because there is no within-group variation in the inequality
measure. In principle, a negative association between life satisfaction and the group inequality index
would be consistent with the \social evil" hypothesis. There is, however, an alternative explanation
8consistent with this negative relationship. Consider v(yi); which is a concave function of individual
income alone. The concavity of the individual utility function will imply a negative relationship
between mean group life satisfaction and group inequality (Atkinson, 1970), even though at the
individual level inequality has no bearing on well-being.
The link between Yitzhaki's relative deprivation and inequality is established by Hey and Lambert
(1980). In particular, x mean group income  and consider two income distributions F1 and F2
where F1 Lorenz dominates F2, in other words F2 is more unequal than F1. Hey and Lambert show
that there will be more relative deprivation at every level of income under F2. Since inequality
averse preferences imply that  +  < 0, higher inequality associated with F2 will have a negative
eect on individual well-being at every level of income. If, on the other hand,  +  = 0 and there
is no aversion to inequality, higher relative deprivation under F2 would have no eect on individual
well-being (see also Deaton 2001).
A number of diculties arise, however, when translating the FS specication to an empirical set-
ting based on large household survey data, namely: (i) whether inequality in the general population
could be expected to produce an evaluative response that could be captured in an empirical test; (ii)
what is the relevant group over which the inequality measure is to be dened; and (iii) the nature of
an appropriate welfare metric. These issues are discussed in more detail below. It is important to
note, however, that these diculties are not specic to the FS specication alone; all of them apply
equally to any study that proposes to examine the relationship between individual life satisfaction
and economic inequality dened for some chosen reference group.
2.3 Relevant reference groups
In laboratory experiments, the relevant reference group is obvious in games involving two subjects,
and most theories of other-regarding preferences in n-person games assume the remaining n   1
actors to form the relevant reference group (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). It is much less clear what the
relevant reference groups are in the general population for purposes of social comparisons, and there
is little consensus in the literature on this issue. In Veblen's description of conspicuous consumption
behaviour the reference level of consumption was set by the auent (Veblen 1994, originally published
in 1899). Duesenberry (1949) in formulating the relative income hypothesis4 took the neighbours as
the group against which relative status is being assessed. The social comparison theory proposed by
Festinger (1954) suggested that individuals seek to compare their abilities/opinions with others who
4The hypothesis is that individual's attitude toward consumption and saving is motivated by his/her income and
consumption relative to the income and consumption of others, rather than by some abstract standard of living.
9are perceived to be similar in relevant dimensions. In this spirit, Van de Stadt et al. (1985) rely on
age, education and employment status as the relevant attributes for social comparison.
In more recent studies that investigate the eect of relative status on well-being, a number of
dierent reference groups have been employed such as a rst stage regression to predict reference
income based on a set of characteristics like age, education, occupation and area of residence (Clark
and Oswald 1996; Senik 2004), as well as reference groups based on age cohorts (Deaton 2001;
McBride 2001), age, education, and region (Eibner and Evans 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005), area
of residence such as US state (Blanchower and Oswald 2004) or the Public Use Microdata Areas from
the US Census (Luttmer 2005), city of residence (Ravallion and Lokshin 2002), country (Graham
and Felton 2006) or even adjacent countries (Diener et al. 1995).
Abundance of various approaches notwithstanding, the true reference groups are ultimately un-
observed. This paper follows Frank and Levine (2007) in assuming that the inequality within a
person's reference group varies directly with the amount of inequality within the respondent's place
of residence. As Frank and Levine argue, `the within-reference group level of inequality for an indi-
vidual is likely to correspond more closely to the degree of inequality in the city in which [the person]
lives than to the degree of inequality in his home country' (Frank and Levine 2007:13). Senik (2004)
similarly suggests that people may be ignorant with regard to the distribution of income at the
national level.
There is indeed some empirical evidence suggesting that reference groups are likely to be local.
Graham and Felton (2006) nd the eect of relative status in Latin America to be strongest at the
city level as compared to the country level. Knight et al. (2009), in an unique study that actually
asks respondents in rural China to dene their reference groups, nd that most respondents (68
percent) compare themselves to others within their village (including immediate neighbours), and
only 11 percent of respondents report reference groups that stretch beyond village limits. Kuhn et
al. (2011), relying on data from the Dutch postcode lottery, nd exogenous income shocks to aect
consumption behaviour only for immediate neighbours.
For these reasons, the empirical analysis relies on reference groups based on the Census Enumer-
ation Areas (CEA) from which the household was drawn, which is the most localised reference group
allowed by the data. While the primary sampling units vary in size across and within countries,
they are rather local, sampled households representing a few thousand inhabitants on average (see
Synovate 2006 for details of the LiTS sampling methodology).
102.4 Evaluative space and status observability
Even if we can agree on a denition of a relevant reference group, this still leaves two key questions:
(i) what is the relevant space over which relative status is considered; and (ii) whether relative status
of any given member of the reference group - however dened - is observable to other members of that
group. In the ultimatum game or in the public goods game the relevant inequality is unambiguously
dened over the sum of money that is being considered in the experiment. In our case, the relevant
space for status considerations is less clear cut, and likely multidimensional. Relative deprivation
concerns may involve not just wealth, but also education, political participation, etc. This is separate
from the question\equality of what", considered by Amartya Sen in the 1979 Tanner Lectures, which
was concerned with the relevant space over which equality should be considered for purposes of
justice (Sen, 1980). In the philosophical inequality literature it has been suggested that the relevant
space over which inequalities matter (for justice) should be resources (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981),
opportunity for welfare (Arneson 1989), access to advantage (G.A. Cohen 1989), opportunities for a
good life (Arneson 2000); capabilities (Sen 1980), or opportunities (Roemer 2000).
In this paper the concern is not with a normative criterion of redistribution, but rather with the
relationship between perceptions of relative deprivation based on status. In this paper the space
over which relative deprivation is measured is that of per capita household expenditures. The choice
is both pragmatic and is based on the need for status to be observable. This is because dierences
in objective well-being between an individual and other members of her reference group can only
give rise to a sense of relative deprivation if these dierences are both observed and perceived to
be relevant. If one's neighbours are better o, but the individual does not perceive them as such,
then there is no obvious reason why she should feel relatively deprived. Status observability is thus
required for an empirical test of inequality aversion to pick-up a non-spurious correlation between
inequality and some measure of welfare. Inequalities in wealth, arguably a salient dimension for
purposes of social comparisons, are also considerably easier to observe than inequalities in education
or political participation. Whereas inequalities in wealth can in principle be captured by both income
and expenditure data, the latter gets us much further along the observability spectrum than income
data, particularly because income tends to be poorly measured in developing countries and, more
importantly, because income is primarily observable when it is spent.
Finally, dening reference groups at the local level also makes it more likely that that distribution
of wealth would be observed. As Lichtenberg (1996: 295) argues, \literal neighbors sometimes have
a special signicance because [...] one is confronted by their houses, their yards, and their cars."
112.5 Adaptation
Sen (2000) argues that individuals may come to terms with their deprivation, even report reasonable
levels of life satisfaction. Thus, even if the level of inequality is observable, it still may not have a
discernible eect on well-being, in the sense of inequality aversion, because of adaptive preferences.
While this is indeed a valid critique, and while there is evidence of adaptive preferences (Frederick
and Loewenstein 1999; Easterlin 2001; Stutzer 2004; Di Tella et al. 2007), adaptation is commonly
incomplete, and tends to be more prominent over gains than over losses (Arkes et al, 2006). Fur-
thermore, Sen's critique pertains primarily to chronic deprivation. With respect to inequality, this
critique would be stronger in a region like Latin America, where a high degree of inequality has been
a long-standing phenomenon, but less so in Eastern Europe, where inequality increased rapidly over
a relatively short period of time. In Russia, for instance, the level of inequality, as measured by the
Gini index, increased from 0.26 in 1990 to 0.41 in 2003, and a number of other transition economies
(Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova) experienced increases in inequality of similar magnitude
(Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006). Milanovic similarly notes that over the past twenty years there has
been a `dramatic shift in the role of Eastern European / Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries from
an \inequality reducing" world middle class to an \inequality increasing" downwardly mobile group'
(Milanovic, 2005: 44).5
The rapid transformation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the increase in inequality that
accompanied it make the experience of transition economies particularly conducive to the analysis
undertaken in this paper, because it is in times of rapid change when inequality is most likely to
elicit an evaluative response. Runciman similarly notes that relative deprivation is most likely to
be heightened when things get sharply better or sharply worse, whereas `[i]t is only poverty which
seems irremediable that is likely to keep relative deprivation low' (Runciman 1972: 22, originally
published in 1966).
2.6 Specifying a welfare metric
In order to empirically test for inequality aversion in the general population, a measure of utility is
needed. Following a growing literature on relative status concerns and inequality, this study relies on
self-reported life satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996; McBride 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin 2002,
2010; Blanchower and Oswald 2004; Senik 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Graham and Felton 2006;
Luttmer 2006; Senik and Grosfeld 2010). While issues such as interpreting self-reported satisfaction
5Milanovic refers to the contribution of the Eastern European / FSU states to the international unweighted in-
equality measure, or what he calls concept 1 inequality.
12scores, relating these scores to the concept of utility, or whether self-reported measures of subjective
well-being are an adequate measure of human welfare are not trivial,6 it is important to note that
studies undertaken to date produce encouraging results in terms of the viability of subjective well-
being measures. For instance, Diener et al. (1995) examined four subjective well-being surveys
in a total of 55 countries with a combined population of 4.1 billion people and a total survey
sample of 100,000 respondents, and found\strong covariation among surveys, despite dierent years,
sample populations, wording, and response formats." The authors further conclude that at least
with regard to self-reported measures of well-being, various scales for measuring subjective well-
being tend to yield similar results across countries, a conclusion that is further strengthened by the
nding that objective variables can predict measures of subjective well-being across countries.7 Frey
and Stutzer (2001) reach a similar conclusion. A number of other studies have similarly found (i)
strong positive associations between measures of subjective well-being and income, health, marriage
and employment, and also between well-being reported by the respondent and assessments of the
respondent's well-being by friends, relatives, or the interviewer; and (ii) that current subjective well-
being measures can predict future behaviour such as marital break-up, or job quits (for a detailed
review of these studies see Clark et al. 2008).
3 Data
The analysis relies on data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), conducted jointly by the World
Bank and the EBRD in 2006. The survey covers 27 transition economies, as well as Turkey and
Mongolia. In each of the countries a nationally representative sample of 1,000 households was selected
for face-to-face interviews. The advantage of the LiTS is that it builds on a consistent sampling
methodology across countries. Within each household the head of household was interviewed about
household expenditures and composition, and the\last birthday"rule was applied to randomly choose
the household member (who could also be the household head) for the remaining modules of the
survey.
The consumption aggregate recorded in the survey is based on household expenditures over a 30
day period on (i) food, beverages and tobacco; (ii) clothing and footwear; (iii) transport and commu-
nication; and (iv) recreation, entertainment, meals outside the home, etc.; as well as (v) education;
(vi) health; (vii) furnishings; (viii) household durable goods; and (ix) other expenditures, categories
6On these issues, see Frey and Stutzer (2001); Kimball and Willis (2006); Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006); Clark
et al. (2008). On the issue of whether happiness data can be viewed as useful indicators of human welfare, see Deaton
(2007) for a dissenting view.
7Diener et al (1995).
13(v)-(ix) being recorded based on a 12 month recall period. These expenditures are recorded in US
Dollars and normalized by household size to construct annual per capita household expenditures. A
common concern with consumption estimates based on a recall module (relative to the gold standard
of a personal diary) has to do with accuracy (Beegle et al 2010; see also Deaton and Zaidi 1999).
Zaidi et al. (2009) compare the welfare aggregate from the LiTS survey to the welfare aggregates
constructed from more detailed Household Budget Surveys (HBS) and the Living Standards Mea-
surement Study (LSMS) surveys used by the World Bank to compute ocial poverty estimates for
the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region. They conclude that the `LiTS consumption aggregate
provides a credible welfare metric with which to paint the prole of variation in living conditions
across ECA' (Zaidi et al 2009: 39).
The survey also records the respondent's opinion on the minimum amount of money required
to make ends meet at the end of the month \living in this dwelling and doing what you do." This
measure of welfare, expressed in USD, is similarly converted to per-capita equivalents.
The measure of relative deprivation is constructed by computing the aggregate gap between the
expenditures of a given individual and the expenditures of all others in the individual's reference
group, whose expenditures are higher than those of the individual in question. This aggregate
expenditure gap is then normalised by the size of the reference group, which is chosen to be the
individual's Census Enumeration Area. In the data, 98 percent of the observations are in clusters
(reference groups) of 20 observations, the size of the reference group ranging from 14 to 25 ob-
servations. In terms of population represented by these reference groups, a CEA represents a few
thousand individuals. Gini indices of local inequality are similarly computed at the CEA level.
As a proxy for utility this analysis relies on the responses to an open-ended life satisfaction
question\All things considered, I am satised with my life now."Possible answers include\strongly
disagree",\disagree", neither disagree nor agree",\agree",\strongly agree."8 Based on these responses,
a binary measure of being\above neutral"is constructed, which evaluates to 1 if the respondent agrees
or strongly agrees, and to zero otherwise. Above neutral life satisfaction was reported by 44 percent
of the overall sample.
[Table 1 here]
In addition, this study employs a number of other attitudinal questions from the survey, such as
questions about the respondent's opinion on factors that important for success in life, or on reasons
why there is need in society today, or on state's involvement in reducing the gap between the rich
8Overall, 2 percent of the sample replied \don't know" or \not applicable" and are excluded from the analysis.
14and the poor. Finally, the survey records a number of standard socio-demographic characteristics
that are normally found to be important determinants of subjective well-being. Summary statistics
the main variables are presented in Table 1. Estimates of the Gini indices of inequality at CEA level
for all countries in the sample are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 here]
4 Empirical analysis of inequality aversion and well-being
The discussion in section 2.2. is operationalised by means of the following empirical specication:
h
ijk = yijk + D(yijk) + yrel
ijk + X0
ijk + k + "ijk
where h
ijk is latent satisfaction, yijk is the per capita consumption of household i from Census
Enumeration Area j in country k, D(yijk) is Yitzhaki's measure of relative deprivation, yrel
ijk =
yijk   jk, and jk is the mean income of the reference group. The correspondence between the
parameters of the theoretical model in section 2.2. and the coecients of the empirical specication
is as follows:  =  + , where  captures, as before, aversion to advantageous inequality. Thus,
the joint test of inequality aversion is the test of the null hypothesis  = 0, and  < 0 (equivalent to
+ < 0) indicates inequality averse preferences based on this joint test. Moreover,  < 0 indicates
aversion to advantageous inequality, and     < 0 (equivalent to  < 0), indicates aversion to
disadvantageous inequality.
To account for a number of confounding factors, the FS model is estimated conditional on a set
X of variables that have been previously found to explain variation in life satisfaction. These include
a second degree polynomial in age (to account for the well-known U-shaped relationship between
age and life satisfaction), sex and education of the respondent, whether the respondent is the head
of the household, household size, area of residence (rural / urban / metropolitan), respondent's
employment status and religious aliation. A dummy for whether there were two respondents in
the household is also included to account for imperfect knowledge of household expenditures by
respondents who are not heads of household.
Regressions also include dummies indicating the nature of respondent's (self-reported) mobility
during the 1989-2006 period, whether downward, upward or stable (baseline). These mobility dum-
mies are based on the answers to a ladder question that asks the respondent to place herself today
(in 2006), and similarly in 1989, on a \ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the rst step, stand
15the poorest people and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest." The inclusion of these
dummies allows also for an inter-temporal reference point, which has been found to be important
in the literature on adaptation (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2001; Di Tella
et al., 2003; Di Tella et al., 2007). Senik (2009), for instance, nds comparisons with own economic
situation prior to 1989 to still be an important determinant of subjective well-being 15 years into
the transition process in Eastern Europe. Since movements from the 1st step to the 2nd, and from
the 5th step to the 6th, for instance, can be perceived as qualitatively dierent, the specication
also controls for the respondent's placement on the current (2006) economic ladder.
To account for dierences in subjective well-being across countries, a set of country dummies is
also included in the regressions. It is further assumed that Pr[h = 1jX] = (X0); such that " is
logistically distributed.9 Finally, within-reference group correlation of the errors is allowed.
The above model is the baseline FS specication for the empirical test of inequality aversion.
Estimates from this model (Table 3), reveal that both for the full sample and for regional subsamples
other than South-Eastern Europe 10 respondents exhibit aversion to disadvantageous inequality,
controlling for a number of characteristics commonly found to be important determinants of life
satisfaction. The coecient which measures aversion to advantageous inequality is also negative,
as suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), but insignicant. The overall test of the hypothesis
 = 0 rejects the null in three out of four cases, nding considerable support for inequality averse
preferences. In practical terms, the estimates of the baseline model imply that a rank-preserving
progressive transfer resulting in a 1 unit (USD 1,000/year/per person) increase in relative deprivation,
holding own income and mean group income constant, would be associated with a 4 percentage points
lower probability of reporting above average life satisfaction. A one standard deviation increase in
relative deprivation (USD 620) would be associated with a 2.4 percentage points lower probability
of reporting above neutral life satisfaction. For the CIS subsample a one standard deviation increase
in relative deprivation would be associated with a 3 percentage points lower probability of reporting
above neutral life satisfaction.
[Table 3 here]
The other variables in the model have expected signs. Age and life satisfaction exhibit a U-shaped
9Logistic regressions are estimated instead of a customary ordered logit specication due to the fact that the chi-
square tests reject the assumption of proportional odds, implicit in the ordered logit specication. Results from the
ordered specications are qualitatively similar.
10The group of EU members comprises Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia; the group of non-EU South-Eastern European countries includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia; the group of CIS countries is comprised of 11 countries,
including all former Soviet Republics with the exception of the Baltic States (included in EU) and Turkmenistan, for
which data were not available.
16relationship with a minimum at around the age of 50, which is consistent with other studies in the
happiness economics literature (Graham 2009). Men report higher satisfaction levels in the overall
sample and in the CIS sub-sample, which is consistent with other ndings from Transition Economies,
although in Western Europe the opposite tends to be the case (Graham 2009). Satisfaction with life
increases with the education level of the respondent, and is also higher for those who are employed
and for those from larger households.
The estimates also suggest an important inter-temporal reference point - downward mobility
during the 1989-2006 period is associated with lower satisfaction with life, holding current position
on the income ladder constant. The coecient on the upward mobility variable is positive, as
expected, but not signicant in any of the specications. Even though 15 years elapsed between the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the LiTS survey, the pre-transition standard of living still looms
large in people's memories (see also Senik 2009). These results are consistent with loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and with adaptation being more complete in the domain of gains
from the reference point relative to the domain of losses (Arkes et al, 2006).
A modied version of the above model is estimated next, where D(yijk) is substituted with Gjk,
the Gini coecient of inequality dened at the reference group level. This specication aims to
test whether inequality aversion can also be captured by looking at the relationship between an
aggregate index of inequality and individual life satisfaction, conditional on the same set of control
variables. There are two main reasons for choosing the Gini index in favour of some other aggregate
index of inequality as, for instance, Theil. First, the Gini index is most commonly used index to
measure inequality, and it is also the index that is generally employed in the studies that estimate a
relationship between the individual satisfaction and the level of inequality. More importantly, Gini
is the theoretically relevant index of inequality, implied by the FS model. To see this, note that
given no within group variation in the Gini index, a regression of individual satisfaction on the Gini
index essentially looks at the relationship between mean group satisfaction and the group's index
of inequality. Aggregating the FS utility specication to group level gives group satisfaction as a
function of mean group income and the group's Gini index of inequality (see section 4.2).
The results are reported in Table 4.11 The Gini coecient has no association with life satisfaction
at conventional signicance levels, which is in line with the earlier results by Senik (2004) and
Graham and Felton (2006) who similarly nd no relationship between inequality and well-being.
As the discussion in section 2.2. suggested, the dierence between the results in Tables 3 and 4,
11In this and all of the tables that follow the conditioning vector remains the same as in Table 3, but the estimates
are omitted to conserve space.
17namely the fact that inequality aversion is captured by the FS specication, but not reected in the
relationship between individual life satisfaction and the Gini index of inequality, can be due to the
fact that the latter, unlike the FS specication, is not adept at capturing inequality aversion driven
by relative status or mobility concerns.
[Table 4 here]
One of the immediate concerns with the results in Table 3 is that we may not be accounting
for all unobserved heterogeneity across reference groups, which may bias the estimates. Accounting
for all unobserved heterogeneity across reference groups by means of reference group xed eects
is not possible with the FS specication for reasons of exact multicollinearity. However, sources of
possible bias are not clear. Yitzhaki's measure of relative deprivation could be higher either because
of higher mean expenditures, or due to higher inequality within the group. The eect of dierences in
mean expenditures across reference groups within countries is captured by the relative expenditures
variable, such that the relative deprivation measure is capturing the degree of expenditure inequality,
which is the primary interest of this analysis. The estimates could be biased however if, for instance,
a particular characteristic were more (less) common within groups with higher inequality, and also
negatively (positively) associated with subjective well-being in ways that are not captured by mean
expenditure dierences across groups or other control variables.
To account for all unobserved heterogeneity across reference groups a conditional xed eects
logit model is estimated (Table 5) in which matching is done within reference groups.12 This is
similar to the analysis of Eibner and Evans (2005), who also estimate from within-reference group
variation, although they rely on a linear specication. In this specication  is identied out of
within reference group variation, accounting for all heterogeneity in unobserved reference group
characteristics. The test for inequality aversion is the joint test of the null hypothesis  = 0. The
estimates in Table 5 conrm the presence of inequality aversion in individual preferences, both in
the overall sample and in the EU and CIS regional sub-samples. In this specication a one standard
deviation increase in relative deprivation is associated with a 3.6 percentage points lower probability
of reporting above neutral life satisfaction in the overall sample, and an 5.3 percentage points lower
probability in the EU subsample.
[Table 5 here]
12Note that the coecient on the own expenditures variable in Table 5 is the counterpart of the ( + ) in Table 4
and not of  alone.
18As a further robustness check, in column (1) of Table 6 the same regression as above is run with
relative deprivation dened in terms of minimum income instead of actual household expenditures.
Minimum income is reported in response to the question `Living in the dwelling and doing what
you do, what would be the minimum amount of money that this household would need to make
ends meet at the end of each month.'13 The estimates suggest that inequality in perceived necessary
minimum income does not have an eect on utility. Upon reection, this is not surprising. The
income that is perceived as being the necessary minimum is likely to already reect the relative
status concerns that may be present. Indeed, as the estimates in column (2) suggest,  < 0, such
that disadvantageous inequality in expenditures has a positive eect14 on the amount of money
deemed to be the necessary minimum.
[Table 6 here]
4.1 What is driving inequality aversion?
What could be the source of inequality aversion? One possibility is that individuals are intrinsically
averse to inequality in outcomes, such that inequality is utility-decreasing even when it can be
considered as just from the social justice perspective. Another possibility is that inequality aversion is
the outcome of perceptions of unfairness with regard to the processes that determine the distribution
of fortunes. With regard to the results of laboratory experiments, the World Development Report
2006 notes that \it is possible to speculate that the aversion to very unequal payo distributions in
the Ultimatum Game arises from the arbitrary and unequal nature of the endowments (or power)
implicit in the initial allocation of the roles of Proposer and Responder" (World Bank 2005: 81).
Graham and Felton (2006) argue that inequality exhibits a negative impact on happiness in Latin
America because it signals persistent unfairness. Alesina, DiTella and MacCulloch (2004) similarly
argue that the strong inequality aversion in Europe is due to a lower degree of mobility in the society,
whereas Americans believe that poverty can be escaped through hard work. Runciman (1972:22)
notes that relative deprivation is brought about by the upsetting of expectations, such as for instance,
when stable expectations are disappointed. The transition period can certainly be described as the
time when stable expectations of many individuals had been disappointed.
An empirical test of this hypothesis is possible with the LiTS data. Respondents were asked
the following question: \In your opinion, what is the main reason why there are some people in
need in our country today?", the possible answers being\because they have been unlucky",\because
13Minimum income is converted to per capita units.
14The eect of advantageous inequality () is negative, as expected, albeit not statistically signicant.
19of laziness and lack of willpower", \because of injustice in our society", \it is an inevitable part of
modern life" and \other". Given the widespread complaints of corruption and the illegally acquired
wealth during the early transition years, as well as the collapse of the social safety nets, it is perhaps
not surprising that more than 40 percent of respondents in the sample reported injustice to be the
main source of need in society. At the same time, more than 20 percent of the sample say that
need is the result of laziness. The baseline FS specication is re-estimated for these two groups of
respondents.
[Table 7 here]
If inequality aversion is indeed brought about by perceptions of unfairness, then it would be
expected to be stronger among those who believe that people are stuck in bad outcomes because
of injustice. At the same time, the skyrocketing inequality should have less of an eect on those
who believe that need is due to laziness, since, as in the American case, their deprivation need not
be unfair. The estimates are reported in Table 7. Indeed, inequality aversion is heightened by the
perception of unfairness. Respondents who believe that need is caused by laziness do not exhibit
inequality averse preferences, unlike respondents who believe that need is caused by injustice.
Respondents were additionally asked about the factors that are important to succeed in life today,
and also about factors important for success prior to 1989. Here the focus is on those who reported
the main factor for success to be `eort and hard work' on the one hand, and `political connections
/ criminal and corrupt ties' on the other hand. Estimates reported in Table 8 suggest aversion
to inequality among those who believe success today to be determined by political connections or
criminal ties, but not among those who believe that hard work is the main determinant of success.
[Table 8 here]
When similar regressions are run for attitudes toward success prior to 1989, the results are
reversed. Inequality averse preferences are observed among those who believe that prior to 1989
hard work was the main factor of success, but not among respondents who believed that before the
transition period started political connections were important. In other words, it seems that those
who believed in the importance of hard work in the past associate the inequality in the distribution
today as not being the result of hard work, but rather of corruption, which is why it has a negative
eect on utility. Those who think that political / criminal connections were important even before
1989 were perhaps less disturbed by the rampant corruption during the transition years. Why should
there be a dierence between the results in columns (2) and (4) if inequality is corruption-driven?
20Recall Runciman's argument that relative deprivation is heightened when expectations are being
disappointed. It is likely that for the subgroup in column (4) the expectations were not disappointed,
if they already saw connections as the main key to success even before 1989.
In addition to institutional factors, it may also be the case that aversion to inequality is driven by
the personal fortunes throughout the turbulent transition years. As suggested by estimates in Table
3, lower status on the socio-economic ladder today relative to 1989 is negatively associated with
reported life satisfaction. One could hypothesize, as do Graham and Felton (2006), that attitudes
toward inequality will be coloured by one's own mobility trajectory during the transition period.
Aversion to inequality may be higher, in particular, among those who moved down the socio-economic
ladder during the 1989-2006 period, according to their own perceptions, and, correspondingly, lower
among the upwardly mobile group. Estimates in Table 9 do not necessarily bear out this hypothesis,
however. The FS specication is re-estimated separately among those who reported being on a lower
ladder step in 2006 than in 1989 (column 1), and those who either stayed in place or moved up the
socio-economic ladder (column 2). The estimates for both of these groups are similar in magnitude
and in both cases  < 0; and albeit the joint test of no inequality aversion is rejected only the case
of the downward mobile group, the magnitudes of the standard errors suggest that the estimates for
the upwardly mobile sample are less precisely estimated.
[Table 9 here]
Future mobility prospects can also inuence one's preferences for the degree of inequality in
society. Benabou and Ok (2001) propose a model in which it can be rational for poor individuals
today to oppose redistribution because they expect to move up the economic ladder in the future
(known as the prospect of upward mobility hypothesis). While respondents' mobility aspirations
are are not available in the data, it is possible to hypothesise that younger cohorts may be more
optimistic about future economic mobility, and hence less averse to inequality, because it may be
easier for them to develop or adapt their skill set to match the changing requirements of the labour
market. To test this empirically I split the sample into three groups based on age tertiles, which
corresponds to the following groups: respondents aged 37 or under, respondents in the 38-55 age
group, and respondents aged 56 or higher) and re-estimate the FS model for each of these age groups.
This split is abritrary, but it ensures that the rst group was 21 or younger in 1989, such that they
completed their tertiary education and entered the labour market after the start of transition. The
results are consistent with the above reasoning - inequality averse preferences are not observed for
the under 35 age group, whereas in the other two groups the joint test of no inequality aversion
21rejects the null of  = 0. These results are also consistent with the ndings of Bellemare et al.
(2008).
[Table 10 here]
4.2 Implications for social welfare
Consider an additive social welfare function of the form W(y) =
 y

0 u(z)dF(z). Aggregating the
the level of reference groups, we obtain:
Wj(y) = j(1   Gj)
where j denotes mean expenditures in cluster j, Gj is the group's Gini index of inequality, and
 =  ( + ). Note that in the case of inequality averse preferences  > 0, as conrmed by the
estimates in section 4.1, such that higher within-group inequality lowers social welfare. Note also
that W(y) resembles Atkinson's formulation W = (1   I), where  is mean group income and I is
the group's measure of inequality. However, it is important to note that Atkinson's social welfare
function is normative in character and has inequality aversion built into it, such that it allows for
reductions in mean income for purposes of greater equality. The social welfare function adopted
here, on the other hand, is utilitarian in nature, and is not per se concerned with inequality. The
fact that the social welfare function allows for tradeos between the size of the pie and the degree
of inequality in its distribution stems from inequality aversion in individual preferences. It is clear
from this formulation that a redistribution of income via a rank-preserving Pigou-Dalton transfer
that decreases inequality will lead to an increase in social welfare, whereas a regressive transfer that
increases inequality would reduce social welfare.
This result is conrmed in Table 11, which presents estimates of PSU-level OLS regressions of
mean PSU life satisfaction on mean PSU expenditures, mean PSU Gini index of inequality, as well
as mean values of control variables collapsed to the level of PSUs. Group level life satisfaction
is positively associated with the average group expenditures and negatively associated with the
group Gini (column 1). The negative association between average life satisfaction and inequality
is maintained if country dummies are added to the specication, such that the estimates draw
only on within-country variation (column 2), and when mean values of other covariates other than
the mobility and current economic rank are accounted for (column 3). The relationship between
inequality and life satisfaction becomes insignicant when we control for the 1989-2006 mobility
22experience (column 4). This latter result is not surprising once it is noted that movements up
and down the socio-economic ladder since 1989 (and in particular wage losses as the result of the
post-1989 economic contraction) are likely among the key determinants of the level of inequality
today.
[Table 11 here]
4.3 Inequality aversion and support for redistribution
Since inequality aversion is inherent in individual preferences, and since these preferences imply that
redistributive policies have a positive eect on social welfare, it should be the case that inequality
averse individuals should favour redistributive policies. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2004) argue that
Europeans, whom they nd to be averse to inequality, should favour redistributive policies since
they believe that the poor are stuck in poverty and are thus worthy of help. It is possible to test for
this using LiTS data, since respondents are asked whether the state should be involved in reducing
the gap between the rich and the poor, possible answers being \[the state should be] not involved",
\moderately involved"and\strongly involved". From these answers a binary variable is created which
evaluates to 1 if the response was\strongly involved", and zero otherwise. The regressions with this
measure as the dependent variable are run for the same subgroups as in Tables 7 and 8 (columns 1
and 2). We would expect inequality aversion, which was found not to be intrinsic but rather linked
to a sense of fairness, to be associated with a favourable attitude toward the redistribution of income.
Likewise, if need is perceived as an outcome of laziness, or success is perceived to be the product of
hard work, inequality need not lead to concerns for the needy and calls for a stronger involvement
of the state in redistributing income.
The estimates in Table 12 conrm this intuition. Higher inequality among those who view need
in society today as the product of injustice or success in society as the product of political or criminal
connections has a positive and statistically signicant eect on the desire for strong state involvement
in bridging the gap between the rich and the poor. Among those who report need as the product




Since 1989 the countries of Eastern Europe have undergone major transformations along a number
of political, economic and social dimensions. One notable outcome of the transition period has been
a considerable increase in economic inequality in the region. With the help of recent survey data
for 27 transition economies, the aim of this paper has been to investigate the degree of tolerance
for inequality in this region. This is a rst account of the relationship between inequality and well-
being in Eastern Europe using consistent survey data for a large number of transition economies.
The paper also contributes to the related literature that looks at whether concerns with equity
commonly noted in laboratory experiments can also be observed in the general population. Whether
or not individuals are averse to inequality is likely to be mirrored in preferences over redistributive
polices and individual well-being.
A test of inequality aversion borrowed from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) nds considerable support
for aversion to inequality in individual preferences, and this result holds across a number of speci-
cations, and also across regional subsets of countries. The benet of this model is that it can detect
aversion to inequality that is driven by status and mobility considerations, a setting where aggregate
inequality measures provide little help. Indeed, this study found that the Gini index was unable to
capture this negative eect of inequality on well-being.
Building on the work by Roemer (2000) and earlier philosophical studies (Sen 1980; Dworkin
1981; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989), a number of recent papers distinguish between overall inequality
and inequality of opportunity. (Bourguignon et al. 2003; Roemer et al. 2003; Ooghe et al. 2007;
Checchi and Peragine 2009; Cogneau and Mesple-Somps 2008; Ferreira and Gignoux 2008; Ferreira
et al. 2008, 2010; Lefranc et al. 2008, 2009). These studies stress that it is inequality of opportunity
that is morally objectionable, as opposed to inequalities generated by dierences in eort. While I do
not formalise a concept of inequality of opportunity in this study, the evidence this paper presents
is suggestive of inequality of opportunity driving attitudes toward overall economic inequality in
transition economies. Aversion to inequality is found not to be intrinsic, but rather tied to a concern
with fairness in the institutions underlying the distribution of fortunes in society.
Inequality averse preferences imply a negative relationship between inequality and social welfare,
even when the underlying social welfare function is utilitarian in character and is not intrinsically
concerned with inequality. This suggests that inequality aversion should be associated with demands
for redistributive policies. Consistent with this intuition, the LiTS data conrm the association
between inequality and demands for strong government involvement in bridging the gap between
24the rich and the poor, but only when inequality is perceived to be unfair. Exploring the extent
and drivers of inequality of opportunity in the region, the factors inuencing economic mobility, and
how they relate to - and are aected by - social policy thus appear to be fruitful avenues for future
research.
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31Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean SD




Compulsory or none 0.230 0.421
Secondary education 0.269 0.444
Professional / vocational 0.311 0.463
University education 0.191 0.393






Head of HH 0.554 0.497
Two respondents 0.384 0.486
Religion









Expenditures per capita (000) 1.861 1.840
Mean reference group expenditures (000) 1.881 1.231
Relative deprivation (000) 0.601 0.636
Minimum income per capita (000) 2.995 2.920
Mean reference group min income (000) 3.007 2.082
Relative deprivation in min income (000) 0.871 1.015
Gini index of inequality (CEA level) 0.303 0.076
Preference for government involvement in redistribution 0.692 0.461
Notes:Estimates based on the full sample of 27 countries.






Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.301 0.082
Bulgaria 0.291 0.074
Croatia 0.305 0.067
Czech Republic 0.246 0.060
Estonia 0.299 0.061


















Notes: Estimates are unweighted averages of CEA level statistics.
33Table 3: Baseline FS model of inequality aversion, by region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own expenditures () 0.021** 0.018 0.030* 0.027
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019)
Relative expenditures () -0.015 -0.022 -0.002 -0.029
(0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022)
Yitzhaki's RD () -0.038*** -0.051** -0.008 -0.069*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.027)
Age -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.014* 0.007 0.008 0.022*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Education (omitted - secondary)
Compulsory or none -0.020* -0.021 -0.044** 0.007
(0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Vocational 0.005 0.006 -0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013)
University 0.052*** 0.077*** 0.041* 0.034*
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013)
HH size 0.012*** 0.014** 0.019*** 0.009**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Employed 0.027*** 0.028 0.025 0.026*
(0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Head of HH -0.014 -0.028 -0.010 0.001
(0.010) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Two respondents 0.018 0.023 0.014 0.023
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Current income rank 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.059***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Mobility (omitted - stable)
Downward mobility 1989-2006 -0.118*** -0.134*** -0.115*** -0.107***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Upward mobility 1989-2006 0.021 0.034 0.002 0.026
(0.012) (0.018) (0.025) (0.022)
Religion (omitted - atheist/agnostic)
Christian 0.003 -0.024 -0.011 0.063**
(0.012) (0.017) (0.031) (0.023)
Muslim 0.026 -0.121 0.017 0.084**
(0.020) (0.096) (0.037) (0.030)
Other -0.033 -0.047 0.038 -0.048
(0.024) (0.032) (0.068) (0.052)
Area of residence (omitted - urban)
Rural -0.008 0.023 -0.019 -0.024
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017)
Metropolitan -0.011 -0.008 -0.048 0.015
(0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.149 0.143 0.191
Obs 23783 7117 7306 9360
 -0.023 -0.029 -0.006 -0.040
Prob>chi2 0.002 0.004 0.729 0.008
Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with All things considered, I am satised
with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither disagrees nor agrees.
Column (1) - full sample; (2) - EU; (3) - SEB; (4) - CIS. Country dummies included but not reported. The
structural parameter  is calculated based on regression estimates, and the associated probability is for the
test of the hypothesis  -  = 0 . Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
34Table 4: Model with the Gini measure of inequality, by region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own expenditures 0.007 0.001 0.027* -0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014)
Relative expenditures 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.014
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Gini 0.044 -0.119 0.176 0.039
(0.069) (0.127) (0.113) (0.113)
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.148 0.143 0.190
Obs 23783 7117 7306 9360
Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with All things considered, I am satised
with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither disagrees nor agrees.
Column (1) - full sample; (2) - EU; (3) - SEB; (4) - CIS. Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 5: Specication with reference group xed eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expenditures ( + ) 0.001 -0.013 0.020* -0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
RD () -0.057*** -0.069*** -0.049 -0.058*
(0.013) (0.018) (0.025) (0.028)
Pseudo R-squared 0.122 0.126 0.127 0.121
Obs 22815 7023 6962 8830
Notes: Conditional xed eects logistic regressions. Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors,
clustered at reference group level in parentheses. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or
strongly agrees with All things considered, I am satised with my life now, and zero if the respondent
strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither disagrees nor agrees. Column (1) - full sample; (2) - EU; (3) - SEB;
(4) - CIS. Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
35Table 6: Further robustness checks
(1) (2)
Minimum income () -0.004
(0.005)
Relative min income () 0.007
(0.006)
RD (minimum income) () 0.002
(0.007)
Own expenditures () 0.936***
(0.137)
Relative expenditures () -0.268
(0.163)







Notes: Average marginal eects in (1) OLS estimates in (2). Robust standard errors, clustered at reference
group level in parentheses. Dependent variable in column (1) equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees
with All things considered, I am satised with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees,
disagrees or neither disagrees nor agrees. Dependent variable in column (2) is the reported minimum amount
of money per capita needed to make ends meet. Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 7: Injustice vs laziness
(1) (2)
Own expenditures () 0.027 0.025*
(0.014) (0.011)
Relative expenditures () -0.017 -0.020
(0.019) (0.013)
Yitzhaki's RD () -0.013 -0.047**
(0.025) (0.016)




Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with All things considered, I am satised
with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither disagrees nor agrees.
Column (1) - sample restricted to respondents who believe that need is the result of laziness and lack of
willpower; column (2) - sample consists of respodents who believe need in society to be the result of injustice.
Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
36Table 8: Hard work vs political and criminal connections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own expenditures () 0.024 0.014 0.024* 0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Relative expenditures () -0.010 -0.009 -0.023 0.022
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018)
Yitzhaki's RD () -0.026 -0.046* -0.045** 0.021
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.025)
Pseudo R-squared 0.173 0.173 0.178 0.174
Obs 9070 7288 12845 4839
 -0.016 -0.036 -0.022 -0.001
Prob>chi2 0.193 0.001 0.022 0.907
Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with All things considered, I am satised
with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither disagrees nor agrees.
Column (1) - Sample restricted to respondents who believe that eort and hard work are the most important
factor to succeed in life now, (2) - respondents who believe political or criminal ties to be the most important
factor to succeed in life now, (3) - respondents who state that eort and hard work were the most impor-
tant factor to succeed in 1989, (4) - respodents who believe political, criminal ties to have been the main
determinant of success in 1989 Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 9: Winners and losers of the transition process
(1) (2)
Own expenditures () 0.021* 0.026
(0.009) (0.015)
Relative expenditures () -0.014 -0.020
(0.012) (0.021)
Yitzhaki's RD () -0.038** -0.048
(0.014) (0.026)




Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees in response to the question All things
considered, I am satised with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither
disagrees nor agrees. Column (1) - downwardly mobile sample; (2) - upwardly mobile or stable sample.
Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
37Table 10: Inequality aversion among young and old respodents
(1) (2) (3)
Own expenditures () 0.011 0.021* 0.029*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Relative expenditures () 0.009 -0.025 -0.025
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
Yitzhaki's RD () -0.007 -0.054** -0.042*
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Pseudo R-squared 0.160 0.175 0.160
Obs 8032 9314 8656
 -0.016 -0.029 -0.017
Prob>chi2 0.198 0.005 0.117
Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees in response to the question All things
considered, I am satised with my life now, and zero if the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees or neither
disagrees nor agrees. Column (1) - respondents ages 37 or younger; (2) - age group 38-55; (3) - 56+ age
group. Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 11: Inequality and well-being across groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean group expenditures 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.037*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Group Gini -1.362*** -0.594** -0.380* -0.217
(0.206) (0.182) (0.184) (0.160)
Country dummies N Y Y Y
Socio-demographic controls N N Y Y
Mobility controls N N N Y
R-squared 0.078 0.457 0.483 0.570
Obs 1350 1350 1350 1349
Notes: OLS estimates from CEA-level regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent
variable is mean reference group life satisfaction. Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
38Table 12: Institutions and attitudes toward redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own expenditures () -0.020 -0.031** 0.011 -0.051***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Relative expenditures () 0.014 0.040** -0.017 0.056***
(0.023) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
Yitzhaki's RD () -0.001 0.033* -0.009 0.041*
(0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.078 0.084 0.093
Obs 5303 10969 9272 7405
 -0.015 -0.007 0.008 -0.015
Prob>chi2 0.439 0.468 0.605 0.168
Notes: Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors, clustered at reference group level in parentheses.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent states strongly involved in response to the question Do you think
the state should be involved in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor? Column (1) - respondents
who believe that need is the result of laziness and lack of willpower; column (2) - respodents who believe
need in society to be the result of injustice. Column (3) - respondents who believe that success is the result
of hard work; column (4) - respondents who believe that success is due to political / criminal connections.
Signicance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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